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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
In the Matter of the Application of
MACRELLO AGRONT, #81-A-5422,

COUNTY OF ALBANY

Petitioner,
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78

of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION and ORDER
INDEX NO. 9831-07
RJI NO. 01-08-ST8548

-against -

WILLIAM LAPE, et aI.,
Respondent.

Supreme Court of Albany County All Purposes Term, April II, 2008
assigned to Justice Joseph C. Teresi

APPEARANCES:
Linda C. Braunsberg, Esq.
Attorney for the Petitioner
370 Powell Street
Staten Island, New York 10312
Andrew M. Cuomo, Esq.
Attorney General of the State
New Yark
Attorney for the Respondents
(Adele Taylor Scott, Esq. AAG)
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224

of

TERESI, J.:
This CPLR Article 78 proceeding is brought by an inmate challenging the denial of
parole. Petitioner asserts in conclusionary fashion that respondent's detennination is arbitrary and
capricious, procedurally defective and irrational. Respondent asserts a general denial and seeks
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dismissal of the petition for failure to state a canse of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7).
Petitioner is serving a tenn of25 years to life after a conviction oftbe crimes of
Manslaughter, 2nd Degree, Manslaughter 151 Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon 2nd
Degree. Petitioner appeared before the Parole Board for his third parole release interview on
January 9, 2007. Parole was denied and the Board ordered the petitioner held for 24 months. The
Board noted petitioner's programing and discipline but denied parole after considering the fact
petitioner killed an irmocent victim, robbed another person and stole a handgun. The Board
concluded that "it is apparent from your behavior that you have a selfish disregard for the life and
welfare of others." On AprilS, 2007 the petitioner filed an appeal with the Parole Appeals Unit.
The determination oftbe Board was affinned on October 25, 2007. Petitioner now brings this
Article 78 proceeding.
The parole board's actions are judicial in nature and may not be reviewed if done in
accordance with the law (see, Executive Law § 259-i(5); ValdeIToma v. Travis, 19 AD 3d 904).
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c) provides that discretio_nary release to parole supervision is not to be
granted to an inmate merely as a reward for good behavior while in prison, but after considering
whether ''there is a"reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain
at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of
society and will not so depreciate the seriousness of his crime as to W1dermine respect for the
law" (Matter of King v New York State Division of Parole, 83 NY 2d 788).
Petitioner argues that -respondents failure to discuss every statutory guideline factor
demonstrates that they were not considered. It is well established that the Parole Board need not
expressly discuss each factor (Matter of King v New York State Division of Parole, supra 71).
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While the relevant statutory factors must be considered, it is well settled that the weight to be

accorded to each of the factors lies solely within the discretion of the Parole Board (Wood v.
Dennison, 25 AD 3d 1056). Petitioner does not meet his burden of overcoming the presumption
that the Board fulfilled its duty and considered all of the factors (Matter of Rivera v. New York
Div. of Parole, 23 AD 3d 863) simply by showing that the Board failed to discnss each or to
include it in the decision (Matter of Hawkins v Travis, 259 AD 2d 813). The Parole Board's

detennination will not be disturbed unless it is so irrational as to border on impropriety (Silman
v. Travis, 95 NY 2d 470).

It is reasonable for the parole board to consider the criminal history and other background
of the parole candidate when deciding on early release (Matter ofTalta v. Dennison. 26 AD 3d

663). The seriousness of the offense is still a valid factor for consideration following a twentyfour month hold, and the board properly inquired into that (see, Executive Law § 259-i(l)(a) and
(2)(c) Matter ofRios v. New York State Div. of Parole, 24 AD 3d 1147). If the Board afforded
greater weight to petitioner's crimina1 behavior, that does not render the denial of parole
irrational or improper (Matter ofDudiev v Travis, 227 AD 2d 863). Executive Law § 259-i(2)c

does not grant parole release merely as a reward for appellant's good conduct or achievements
while incarcerated (Larrier v New York State Board of Parole Anueals Unit, 283 AD 2d 700). In
addition, the Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period of24 months is
within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record (Matter ofTalta v. State, 290 AD
2d 907; Iv denied 98 NY 2d 604).

Petitioner's claim that he was denied due process has been examined and fmUld to be
without merit. Executive Law § 259-i, does not create an entitlement to release on parole and
3

[* 4 ]

therefore does not create interests entitled to due process (Paunetto v. Hammock, 516 F. Supp
1367 [US Dist. Ct., SD NY, 1981]). There is no due process right to parole (Russo v. New York
State Board of Parole, 50 NY 2d 69). Also, there is no due process right to an inmate obtaining a
statement as to what he should do to improve his chances for parole in the future ffioothe v.
Hammmock 605 F. 3d 661 (2"' Cir 1979)). Appellant's claim that the denial of parole release
amoWlted to resentencing is without merit. (Crews v. New York State Executive Department of
Parole Appeals Unit, 281 AD 2d 672).
Petitioner is incorrect in asserting that he had a legitimate expectation of early release
from prison based on the state's sentencing scheme. New York's system is discretionary and
holds out no more than the possibility of parole. (Matter of Russo v. New York State Board of
Parole. supra 74). Petitioner is also incorrect in arguing that he is entitled to release because he
,has served more than the parole guidelines. The guidelines are intended only as a guide and are
not a substitute for the careful consideration of the many circumstances of each individual case.
(Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 AD 2d 742, Iv dismissed 98 NY 2d 669). The parole ranges
simply serve as benchmarks for the discretionary determinations rather than as the limits upon
the exercise of discretion. (see, Executive Law § 259-c(4); 9 NYCRR § 8001.3(a); Matter of
Ganci v. Hammock. 99 AD 2d 546). The Board is vested with discretion to determine whether
release is appropriate, notwithstanding what the minimum period of incarceration which was set

by the sentencing court. (Cody v. Dennison, 33 AD 3d 1141; Iv denied 8 NY 3d 802).
Petitioner alleges the Board failed to consider the sentencing minutes and the
recommendations oftbe sentencing judge. The respondent offered a copy of the sentencing
minutes dated November 18, 1981. The record does not contain any recommendation from the
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sentencing judge. Although the Board is required to consider recommendations of the sentencing
court (Edwards v. Travis, 304 AD 2d 576, "the Board must consider a recommendation
contained in sentencing minutes once an inmate informs the Board of the existence of the
recommendation" (Daniel Carter v. Robert Dennison, Index No. 4294-04, Supreme Court,
Albany County, November 8, 2004). Petitioner did not inform the Board of any sentencing
recommendations and a review of the sentencing minutes indicates that no recommendation was
made by the Court relating to parol release. (Schettino v. New York State Division of Parole, 45
AD 3d 1086).
Petitioner's allegation that the Board has adopted a more punitive approach toward
convicted violent offenders is also unfounded. Courts have consistently rejected unsupported
allegations that the Board merely effectuates an informal executive policy when it denies parole
release to violent offenders. (Matter of Scott v. New York State Div. of Parole, 23 AD 3d 950).
Moreover, a review of the record reveals that petitioner's speculative and conclusionary assertion
that his denial of parole was influenced by political or media pressures is unpersuasive. (Matter
of Huber v. Travis, 264 AD 2d 887).
Finally, petitioner offers no proof, other than a conclusionary allegation that the Board's
decision was predisposed to denying his release and therefore, his argwnent with respect to
theses issues are without merit (Matter of Connelly v. New Yark State Division of Parole, 286
AD 2d 792, appeal dismissed 97 NY 2d 677). The record discloses the Board rendered its
determination after considering the full record, including the hearing testimony, the petitioner's
institutional background, his criminal history and release plans (Salahuddin v. Dennison, 34 AD
3d 1082; Matter of Colon v. Travis, 305 AD 2d 407). Since respondent acted in accordance with
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the statutory requiremeots, and the petitioner has failed to meet his burdeo of showing
inationality bordering on impropriety, judicial interference is unwarranted (Matter of Russo v.
NYS Board of Parole, suvra 77).
All papers, including this Decision and Order are being returned to the attorneys for the
respondent. The signing of this Decision and Order shall not constitute entry or filing under
CPLR 2220. Counsel are not relieved from the applicable provision of that section respecting to
filing, entry and notice of entry.
So Ordered.
Dated: Albany, New York
May
,2008
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Order to Show Cause dated February 11,2008;
Verified Petition dated February 8, 2008 with attached exhibits A-R;
Verified Answer dated April 3, 2008;
Affirmation of Adele Taylor Scott, Esq. dated April 3, 2008 with attached exhibits A-I;
Affirmation of Linda C. Braunsberg, Esq. dated April 24, 2008.
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